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Playing for RealGame Theory$
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Ken Binmore

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780195300574

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300574.001.0001

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 Seeking Refinement

 Seeking Refinement

Chapter:
(p.407) 14 Seeking Refinement
Source:
Playing for Real
Author(s):

Ken Binmore (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300574.003.0014

This chapter offers a critical review of attempts to refine the idea of a Nash equilibrium. It begins by reiterating the arguments against a naïve interpretation of subgame-perfect equilibria using Selten's Chain-Store Game as an example. It then introduces assessment equilibria as a simplified version of Kreps and Wilson's sequential equilibrium. The idea is then used to analyze a boundedly rational version of the Centipede Game. Two signaling games — the Burning Money Game and Quiche — are used to discuss forward induction and the intuitive criterion, both of which are found wanting. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of rationalizability, which is a coarsening of the Nash equilibrium concept.

Keywords:   Chain-Store paradox, trembling hand, backward induction, gang of four, Centipede Game, signaling game, Burning Money Game, David Kreps, Quiche Game

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