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Playing for RealGame Theory$
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Ken Binmore

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780195300574

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300574.001.0001

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 Keeping Up to Date

(p.383) 13 Keeping Up to Date
Playing for Real

Ken Binmore (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter is about Bayesian decision theory. It explains why game theorists model players' beliefs using subjective probability distributions, and how these beliefs are updated using Bayes' rule as further information is received during the play of a game. A skeptical assessment of Bayesian decision theory as a solution to the general problem of scientific induction is then offered, suggesting that we stick to Leonard Savage's view that his theory properly applies only in the context of a small world. The chapter ends with a brief review of the common prior assumption and the idea of subjective equilibria.

Keywords:   Bayesian rationality, Bayes' rule, Leonard Savage, Dutch book, posterior probability, prior probability, objective probability, subjective probability, logical probability, Ellsberg paradox

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