Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Playing for RealGame Theory$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Ken Binmore

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780195300574

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300574.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 17 October 2019

 Getting the Message

 Getting the Message

(p.353) 12 Getting the Message
Playing for Real

Ken Binmore (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter explains how game theory treats problems of knowledge and information. The knowledge and possibility operators are defined and related to the idea of an information set in games. The idea of perfect recall is introduced and shown to imply that mixed strategies can be simplified to behavioral strategies. The subject of common knowledge is discussed at length, including Aumann's result on when players may agree to disagree. The chapter ends with a discussion of David Lewis's claim that common knowledge is necessary for coordinated action, in which an alternative analysis of Rubinstein's Email Game is offered.

Keywords:   decision problem, knowledge operator, modal logic, Robert Aumann, perfect recall, Kuhn's theorem, behavioral strategy, mutual knowledge, complete information, coordinated action

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .