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Playing for RealGame Theory$
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Ken Binmore

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780195300574

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300574.001.0001

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 Getting Locked In

 Getting Locked In

(p.3) 1 Getting Locked In
Playing for Real

Ken Binmore (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter uses the Prisoner's Dilemma as the linking idea in an overview of many of the topics covered later in the book. The basic ideas are that of a dominated strategy and a Pareto-efficient outcome. Various fallacies that promote the latter notion over the former are considered. At the same time, the chapter introduces problems in the private provision of public goods, the economic theory of imperfect competition, repeated games, the tragedy of the commons, and mechanism design. The idea of a Nash equilibrium is introduced.

Keywords:   Prisoner's Dilemma, strategies, public goods, free rider problem, Nash equilibrium, dominated strategy, Pareto-efficient outcome, imperfect competition, tragedy of the commons, mechanism design

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