Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Intricate EthicsRights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

F. M. Kamm

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780195189698

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195189698.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 02 July 2020

Intention, Harm, and the Possibility of a Unified Theory

Intention, Harm, and the Possibility of a Unified Theory

Chapter:
(p.78) 3 Intention, Harm, and the Possibility of a Unified Theory
Source:
Intricate Ethics
Author(s):

F. M. Kamm

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195189698.003.0004

One of Warren Quinn's primary aims in his writings on normative theory is to justify revisionist versions of nonconsequentialist doctrines that draw moral distinctions between doing and allowing harm (which he calls the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing [DDA]) and between intending and merely foreseeing harm (the Doctrine of Double Effect [DDE]). According to Quinn, omitting to act because one intends that an object move, though one foresees that its movement will harm someone, is to be classed with acting as a second form of what he calls “positive agency.” Other omissions are classed as “negative agency.” Quinn locates the DDE's foundation in a thesis related to that of the special authority someone has over himself raised in connection with the DDA, namely, that what is one's own should not be used without one's permission, when this will lead to one's being harmed, and so someone else should not intend the employment of what is one's own without one's permission, when this will lead to one's being harmed.

Keywords:   Warren Quinn, harm, Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, Doctrine of Double Effect, positive agency, authority, permission

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .