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Are We Free?Psychology and Free Will$
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John Baer, James C. Kaufman, and Roy F. Baumeister

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780195189636

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195189636.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 20 September 2019

Some Observations on the Psychology of Thinking About Free Will

Some Observations on the Psychology of Thinking About Free Will

Chapter:
(p.248) 12 Some Observations on the Psychology of Thinking About Free Will
Source:
Are We Free?
Author(s):

Daniel C Dennett (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195189636.003.0012

Whether free will is real or illusory is such an important topic that many thinkers overreact to it, jumping to invalid conclusions in their desire to fend off what they see as either mystical or nihilistic visions. This chapter examines three instances of this overshooting in recent work by Daniel Wegner, Richard Dawkins, and Sue Blackmore. It reaches the conclusion that free will, in the only sense worth wanting, is real but not quite what most people think it is. In spite of what many people uncritically suppose, indeterminism is not required for genuine free will.

Keywords:   determinism, magic, responsibility, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Wegner, Sue Blackmore

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