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Michael E. Bratman

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780195187717

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195187717.001.0001

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Nozick on Free Will

Nozick on Free Will

(p.106) Chapter 6 Nozick on Free Will
Structures of Agency

Michael E. Bratman

Oxford University Press

The idea of a reflexive self-governing policy that can be underdetermined by value judgment, and that plays a role in Lockean identity, is similar in important respects to Robert Nozick's idea of a “self-subsuming decision that bestows weights to reasons.” Nozick develops this idea in his work, Philosophical Explanations, in which he explores some of the deepest issues in philosophy. Nozick examines fundamental questions about, among other things, personal identity, knowledge, free will, value, and the meaning of life. This chapter comments on Nozick's discussion of free will and incompatibilism. The Appendix argues that there remains a serious issue, within Nozick's discussion, about how to explain agential authority and about the precise philosophical work that can be done by appeal to the very idea of a decision.

Keywords:   Robert Nozick, philosophy, free will, self-governing policy, personal identity, incompatibilism, agential authority, decision, Philosophical Explanations

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