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Causal ModelsHow People Think about the World and Its Alternatives$
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Steven Sloman

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780195183115

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183115.001.0001

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Causality and Conceptual Structure

Causality and Conceptual Structure

Chapter:
(p.116) 9 Causality and Conceptual Structure
Source:
Causal Models
Author(s):

Steven Sloman

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183115.003.0009

The objects that we select and how we put them together depend on our current goals, the task before us, and on our language and culture. It may be argued that concepts are not fixed, stable entities in the mind. Nevertheless, people do bring general knowledge to bear to understand objects and events. This chapter focuses on the structure of that general knowledge, in particular, on its causal structure. Research is presented that uses a variety of measures of categorization. The most frequent is naming — objects are assumed to belong in the same category if they are called by the same name.

Keywords:   categorization, selection, general knowledge, causal structure, naming

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