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Lines of ThoughtCentral Concepts in Cognitive Psychology$
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Lance Rips

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780195183054

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183054.001.0001

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Causes

Causes

Chapter:
(p.119) 3 Causes
Source:
Lines of Thought
Author(s):

Lance J. Rips (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183054.003.0004

Traditional psychological approaches to causality assume that we acquire causal information by extracting it from our experience of events. One possibility is that we can directly perceive causality (or can use a specialized perceptual module) to detect causal interactions. Another possibility is that we infer causality from correlational evidence—the co-occurrence of particular causes and effects. This chapter argues that these purely bottom-up solutions are unlikely to succeed. It considers a new approach to causal cognition that may alleviate these difficulties which comes from research on Bayes nets in computer science.

Keywords:   causality, causal cognition, causal theories, Bayes nets, events

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