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Natural Justice$
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Ken Binmore

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780195178111

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195178111.001.0001

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Duty

Duty

Chapter:
(p.93) Chapter 6 Duty
Source:
Natural Justice
Author(s):

Ken Binmore (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195178111.003.0006

Metaphysical moral theories can be loosely be divided into theories of the Good or Right. Naturalistic theories can be said to be theories of the seemly — what is appropriate in a particular place and time. This chapter explains how rights and duties can fit within a theory of the seemly. You have a right to do something if you do not have a duty not to do it. You have a duty to do something if you would otherwise diverge from equilibrium play in the social contract currently operated by your society.

Keywords:   rights, duty, moral responsibility, free will

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