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John Buridan$
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Gyula Klima

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780195176223

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176223.001.0001

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Buridan’s Essentialist Nominalism

Buridan’s Essentialist Nominalism

Chapter:
(p.259) 13 BURIDAN’S ESSENTIALIST NOMINALISM
Source:
John Buridan
Author(s):

Gyula Klima (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176223.003.0013

The final chapter provides a summary account of Buridan’s essentialist nominalism, showing how Buridan can successfully claim to be both a nominalist denying the existence of real shared essences and an essentialist endorsing the possibility of discovering truly essential attributes of things, which allows valid scientific generalizations. The concluding critical part of the chapter, however, points out a fundamental conflict between Buridan’s abstractionist cognitive psychology of absolute concepts and his logical semantics of the corresponding absolute terms that grounds his nominalist essentialism.

Keywords:   essentialist nominalism, scientific generalizations, cognitive psychology, logical semantics, absolute concepts, absolute terms

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