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John Buridan$
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Gyula Klima

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780195176223

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176223.001.0001

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The Possibility of Scientific Knowledge

The Possibility of Scientific Knowledge

Chapter:
(p.234) 11 THE POSSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
Source:
John Buridan
Author(s):

Gyula Klima (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176223.003.0011

This chapter provides a brief survey of Buridan’s reliabilist epistemology, contrasting it with skeptical challenges of his time, and comparing it with modern responses to similar skeptical challenges in modern philosophy, arguably stemming from the controversies of Buridan’s time. In particular, the chapter argues that the sort of “Demon-skepticism” modern readers are familiar with from Descartes was made conceptually possible precisely by the emergence of late-medieval nominalist semantics, and that the modern strategies responding to the skeptical challenge, exemplified by the works of Thomas Reid and most recently John Greco, originate in the epistemic principles of Buridan.

Keywords:   reliabilism, Demon-skepticism, Thomas Reid, John Greco

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