Through Pakistani Ambassador Agha Hilaly, Zhou Enlai, the Chinese premier was able to send his message to Kissinger regarding his government's willingness to have a direct meeting or discussions with the United States. Thus, a breakthrough had arrived. All that remained was to decide on who would go and when. In this chapter, the author examines what prompted Kissinger's secret trip, codenamed Polo I, rather than an open one despite Zhou's April 27 message. It explores ideas about whether the secrecy of Kissinger's trip to China grew from a mixture of domestic political motives, international calculations, or personal ambition. Other breakthroughs discussed in this chapter are ping-pong diplomacy and the Soviets' decision to accelerate the détente process.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.