Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Continuity of Mind$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Michael Spivey

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780195170788

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195170788.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 22 July 2019

Toward a Continuity Psychology

Toward a Continuity Psychology

Chapter:
(p.3) 1 Toward a Continuity Psychology
Source:
The Continuity of Mind
Author(s):

Michael Spivey (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195170788.003.0001

This chapter outlines the goals of the book: to bring together dynamical systems theory, cognitive and computational neuroscience, connectionism, and ecological psychology to provide an understanding of the mind that is not based on discrete symbols and logical rules. It introduces the concept of a state space embodying all the possible patterns of activation that could, in principle, be exhibited by a group of neurons. Thus, transitioning from one thought (i.e., pattern of neural activation) to another necessarily involves a rather continuous trajectory through that space. This chapter also provides some initial visual depictions and experiential demonstration of this continuous flow in mental activity.

Keywords:   cognition, connectionism, representation, information processing, dynamical systems

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .