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Dynamic EconomicsOptimization by the Lagrange Method$
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Gregory C. Chow

Print publication date: 1997

Print ISBN-13: 9780195101928

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195101928.001.0001

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Dynamic Games

Dynamic Games

Chapter:
(p.111) Chapter Six Dynamic Games
Source:
Dynamic Economics
Author(s):

GREGORY C. CHOW

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195101928.003.0006

The dynamic game theory—which is commonly used to study pricing methods in oligopolic situations—is introduced in this chapter through the dynamic optimization perspective. A model of dynamic games involves identifying two players that are both attempting to solve the standard problem of dynamic optimization through making use of a variable to denote the vector state. While the return factor and the discount factor may be specific, each player is expected to maximize a certain Lagrangean expression that is subject to a particular constraint. Depending on the empirical problems, one can utilize either the Nash solution wherein each player is to solve the optimization problem by taking the other player’s decision as given, or the Stakleberg solution which assigns a dominant player.

Keywords:   dynamic game, oligopoly, dynamic optimization, Nash solution, Stakleberg solution

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