Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Character$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Joel J. Kupperman

Print publication date: 1995

Print ISBN-13: 9780195096545

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195096545.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 25 May 2019

Ethical Theory and Choice

Ethical Theory and Choice

Chapter:
(p.67) 4 Ethical Theory and Choice
Source:
Character
Author(s):

Joel J. Kupperman

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195096545.003.0004

This chapter explores ways in which an ethical theory can develop through time and, in particular, variations in Kantian ethical theories. The chapter argues that a Kantian could say that we have duties to particular people as part of ongoing commitments, but an adequate and sufficient account of good and poor decisions in personal relationships cannot be based entirely on the categorical imperative, nor can we do justice to seriously wrong decisions by regarding them as violations of duty. Any ethical philosophy, which includes an adequate account of ongoing personal commitments, will have to recognize that our judgments of what is wrong are of more than one sort and are made, so to speak, in more than one kind of voice.

Keywords:   ethical theory, Kantian ethics, ethical philosophy, Kant's theory, morality, ethical choice, reflection, explicit choice, choice

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .