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The New Power PoliticsNetworks and Transnational Security Governance$
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Deborah Avant and Oliver Westerwinter

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780190604493

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190604493.001.0001

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Bargaining in Networks

Bargaining in Networks

Relationships and the Governance of Conflict Diamonds

Chapter:
(p.196) 8 Bargaining in Networks
Source:
The New Power Politics
Author(s):

Oliver Westerwinter

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190604493.003.0008

This chapter examines how states, the diamond industry, and non-governmental organizations used their positions in informal networks to influence the monitoring of conflict diamonds in the Kimberley Process. The Kimberley Process started out with a self-reporting monitoring system, but soon adopted a more rigorous peer review arrangement. What explains this change? Transnational public-private governance schemes are the result of tripartite bargaining. In an environment characterized by unanimity decision-making, uncertainty, and integrative bargaining, centrality and brokerage in informal networks can be bargaining advantages. Actors in such positions can access and manipulate the flow of information among negotiators which enables them to craft better bargaining strategies, structure the negotiation process, and mediate agreement. The empirical analysis presented in this chapter illustrates that actors’ ability to shape the institutional design of transnational public-private governance can hinge on their relationships to others. It also shows that relational negotiation strategies are well-suited to generate new collective action.

Keywords:   Kimberley Process, conflict diamonds, institutional design, monitoring, bargaining, centrality, brokerage

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