This chapter is the first of four examining the RIT model’s equilibria and is devoted to an equilibrium occurring under objective questioning only: valuable information, surprise torture. In this equilibrium, a Cooperative Detainee provides information but is tortured afterward because the Interrogator either has not understood the information as valuable or believes the Detainee is still hiding other information. The Detainee is surprised because he anticipated that the Interrogator would believe he had divulged everything. An Innocent Detainee is also tortured for telling the truth of not having information. The chapter then explores some of the formal properties of the equilibrium, including its placement in the parameter space, and derives some observations, propositions, and implications. The story of Sheila Cassidy, who was tortured by the Chilean secret police, provides an empirical example of the equilibrium. The chapter concludes by returning to the equilibrium in light of the Cassidy case.
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