Distinguishing Conditions in Which Biomarkers Properly Reduce Legal Responsibility
This chapter discusses the relevance of bioprediction to reductions in legal responsibility. The chapter responds to general objections in the context of neuroscience and law to the use of probabilistic information and probabilistic inferences from group data in criminal court by appealing to Bayesianism and the Probability Dysfunction concept of disorder. The chapter then suggests that one place that neural biomarkers may become relevant to criminal law is through legal structures that evoke the “reasonable man” standard, for example, in provocation. He argues that in cases where there is sufficient evidence that the likelihood of violent response is influenced by certain legally relevant mechanisms, such as increased emotional gravity of the provocation to the person, that biomarker evidence is probative to the legal issue in question. He answers these questions in the context of real-world cases in which testing was performed for a predictive biomarker, the monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) gene-environment interaction.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.