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Kantian Conceptual Geography$
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Nathaniel Jason Goldberg

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780190215385

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190215385.001.0001

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Dualism, Principlism, Kantianism

Dualism, Principlism, Kantianism

Chapter:
(p.3) One Dualism, Principlism, Kantianism
Source:
Kantian Conceptual Geography
Author(s):

Nathaniel Jason Goldberg

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190215385.003.0001

Chapter One begins by discussing the very idea of Kantian conceptual geography and explaining why engaging in it is of the utmost importance to analytic philosophy. It then introduces Empirical Dualism, Subjective Principlism, and Kantianism—three theses central to this work. Next it shows that all three theses can be drawn from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Afterward the chapter considers views that contrast with Kantianism. These include Platonic and Aristotelian realism, Berkeleian idealism, Lockean hybridism, and Hegelian pragmatism. After that it provides a plan for subsequent chapters of the book. Finally the chapter addresses the worry that Kantian conceptual geography is inconsistent with naturalism.

Keywords:   Aristotelian realism, Berkeleian idealism, conceptual geography, Empirical Dualism, Hegelian pragmatism, Kantianism, Lockean hybridism, Naturalism, Platonic realism, Subjective Principlism

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