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Agency and Autonomy in Kant's Moral TheorySelected Essays$
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Andrews Reath

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780199288830

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199288836.001.0001

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Agency and the Imputation of Consequences in Kant's Ethics

Agency and the Imputation of Consequences in Kant's Ethics

Chapter:
(p.250) 9 Agency and the Imputation of Consequences in Kant's Ethics
Source:
Agency and Autonomy in Kant's Moral Theory
Author(s):

Andrews Reath (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199288836.003.0010

This chapter analyzes the structure and underlying rationale of Kant's principles of imputation (Zurechnung), with particular concern for his principles governing the moral imputation of bad consequences. It shows how Kant's principles make the imputation of actions and consequences a question for practical reason, rather than a straightforward factual, causal, or metaphysical issue. For Kant, the imputation of actions and consequences is made within the context of, and depends upon, the application of first-order moral norms governing conduct (those setting out strict moral requirements). It suggests that Kant's principles of imputation are generally sound, though they need to be qualified in important ways.

Keywords:   principles of imputation, Zurechnung, moral norms, bad consequences

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