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I: The Meaning of the First Person Term$
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Maximilian de Gaynesford

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780199287826

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199287821.001.0001

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Questions of Logic

Questions of Logic

Chapter:
(p.68) 4 Questions of Logic
Source:
I: The Meaning of the First Person Term
Author(s):

Maximilian de Gaynesford (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199287821.003.0005

‘The guarantee’, or the claim that any use of I is logically guaranteed against reference-failure as a matter of the meaning of the term, is a myth. If security is a semantic truth, I cannot be a genuinely singular referring term. There is no argument for ‘the guarantee’, which is independent of ‘rule theory’ and ‘independence’. Even professed advocates of ‘the guarantee’ turn out to defend a non-semantic explanation of security.

Keywords:   the guarantee, reference-failure, security, logical guarantee, semantic truth, pragmatic explanation, Anscombe, Strawson

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