Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Knowability Paradox$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Jonathan L. Kvanvig

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780199282593

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199282595.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 19 February 2020

Conclusion

Conclusion

Chapter:
(p.199) 7 Conclusion
Source:
The Knowability Paradox
Author(s):

Jonathan L. Kvanvig (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199282595.003.0008

This chapter discusses the process of developing a solution to knowability paradox. It presents a detailed analysis of the paradox. It argues that the neo-Russellian theory of quantification is the only acceptable solution to the paradox, since no other approach offers any hope of addressing the fundamental paradoxicality involved in asserting a lost logical distinction between actuality and possibility.

Keywords:   knowability paradox, truth, neo-Russellian theory of quantification, semantics

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .