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Scepticism Comes Alive$
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Bryan Frances

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199282135

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199282137.001.0001

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The Sceptical Solution

The Sceptical Solution

(p.73) 6 The Sceptical Solution
Scepticism Comes Alive

Bryan Frances (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

It is argued that most of the counterintuitive elements of traditional sceptical theories do not apply to the live sceptical theories, and that the live sceptic’s argument is identical in form to arguments we rely on without hesitation. The live sceptic is not denying anyone of the warrant they think they have; neither are they denying its quality. The knowledge denied by the live sceptic (knowledge of our own beliefs, the locations of our own pains, and the colours of objects in perfect view) is frequently ruled out in uncontroversial circumstances. This is important to the live sceptic’s case because it might be objected that it’s nearly impossible not to know one’s own beliefs, pain locations, or sock colours when the beliefs are formed in maximally veridical ways.

Keywords:   scepticism, rule out, experts, error theory, warranted assertability manoeuvres, knowledge, defeaters, belief eliminativism, colour eliminativism, character trait eliminativism

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