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Microeconomic TheoryA Concise Course$
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James Bergin

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199280292

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199280290.001.0001

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Equilibrium in Extensive Form Games

Equilibrium in Extensive Form Games

Chapter:
(p.159) 10 Equilibrium in Extensive Form Games
Source:
Microeconomic Theory
Author(s):

James Bergin (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199280290.003.0010

Equilibrium in extensive form games is considered. Covers Nash equilibrium, perfect equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The classic chain store paradox example is discussed to illustrate.

Keywords:   equilibrium refinements, Extensive for games, perfection, sequential equilibrium, the chain store paradox

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