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The Samaritan's DilemmaThe Political Economy of Development Aid$
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Clark C. Gibson, Krister Andersson, Elinor Ostrom, and Sujai Shivakumar

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199278855

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199278857.001.0001

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All Aid is Not the Same: The Incentives of Different Types of Aid

All Aid is Not the Same: The Incentives of Different Types of Aid

Chapter:
(p.112) 6 All Aid is Not the Same: The Incentives of Different Types of Aid
Source:
The Samaritan's Dilemma
Author(s):

Clark C. Gibson

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199278857.003.0006

Different types of aid can generate different incentives. Aid is commonly interpreted as an incentive to spur policy change in recipient governments. This chapter looks at how the modalities, means, and conditions of aid can produce different kinds of incentives and, in this way, engender a variety of outcomes.

Keywords:   tied-aid, aid conditionality, project aid, program aid, sector-wide approaches, humanitarian assistance, technical cooperation

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