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The Retreat of ReasonA dilemma in the philosophy of life$
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Ingmar Persson

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199276905

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199276900.001.0001

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THE STRUCTURE OF REASONS: INTERNALISM

THE STRUCTURE OF REASONS: INTERNALISM

Chapter:
(p.110) 8 THE STRUCTURE OF REASONS: INTERNALISM
Source:
The Retreat of Reason
Author(s):

Ingmar Persson (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199276900.003.0009

The purpose of this chapter is to defend the internalist view that reasons for action and desire conceptually require a link to desires. This link to desire takes a more direct form in the case of ‘apparent’ reasons, which form the content of our thoughts, than ‘real’ reasons, which are truths that may be unknown to us. It is claimed that practical reasoning, in which desires are derived, differs from theoretical reasoning in which beliefs are derived in two respects: it is not inferential, and the derived desire concerns a proposition which is ‘epistemically prior’, i.e. which can be established as true sooner, whereas the derived belief concerns a proposition which is epistemically posterior.

Keywords:   apparent reasons, internalism, practical reasoning, real reasons, theoretical reasoning

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