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The Retreat of ReasonA dilemma in the philosophy of life$
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Ingmar Persson

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199276905

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199276900.001.0001

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WEAKNESS OF WILL

WEAKNESS OF WILL

Chapter:
(p.168) 12 WEAKNESS OF WILL
Source:
The Retreat of Reason
Author(s):

Ingmar Persson (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199276900.003.0013

The possibility of akrasia or weakness of will, i.e., the phenomenon of agents acting against their best judgement or reasons, presents a problem for internalism. This chapter reviews and rejects a number of accounts of weakness of will by Donald Davidson, Christine Korsgaard, Alfred Mele, Gary Watson and others. It ends by providing an account weakness of will which is consistent with internalism, as acting against the best reasons that are dispositionally stored in the agent’s mind, but which fail to be causally operative by failing to become occurrent.

Keywords:   krasia, Donald Davidson, internalism, Christine Korsgaard, Alfred Mele, Gary Watson, weakness of will

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