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The Retreat of ReasonA dilemma in the philosophy of life$
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Ingmar Persson

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199276905

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199276900.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 16 October 2019

THE RATIONALITY OF PARA-COGNITIVE ATTITUDES

THE RATIONALITY OF PARA-COGNITIVE ATTITUDES

Chapter:
(p.158) 11 THE RATIONALITY OF PARA-COGNITIVE ATTITUDES
Source:
The Retreat of Reason
Author(s):

Ingmar Persson (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199276900.003.0012

This chapter explains that according to subjectivism, a desire can be rationally required only relative to some other desire. Thus, only derivative desires can be rationally required; intrinsic desires can only be rational in the sense of not being irrational. It is pointed how this account of the rationality of desires is superior to the similar account given by Richard Brandt, but the latter is also defended against some criticisms that have been levelled against it. Two notions of rational thinking are also distinguished. The chapter closes with a summary of the kinds of reasons which have been discussed in part II of this book.

Keywords:   Richard Brandt, intrinsic desires, rational desires, rational thinking, reasons, subjectivism

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