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The Retreat of ReasonA dilemma in the philosophy of life$
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Ingmar Persson

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199276905

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199276900.001.0001

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THE DESIRE RELATIVITY OF VALUE

THE DESIRE RELATIVITY OF VALUE

Chapter:
(p.143) 10 THE DESIRE RELATIVITY OF VALUE
Source:
The Retreat of Reason
Author(s):

Ingmar Persson (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199276900.003.0011

This chapter supplies a subjectivist definition of intrinsic value in terms of what satisfies intrinsic desires in a specified sense, and of derivative value by reference to intrinsic value. Other subjectivist accounts proposed by Peter Railton, Henry Sidgwick, and Michael Smith, which appeal to better informed desires, are critically examined. According to subjectivism, all value is value for some subject, but a narrower sense of value for personal value is defined in terms of what satisfies self-regarding desires.

Keywords:   intrinsic desire, intrinsic value, personal value, Peter Railton, self-regarding desire, Henry Sidgwick, Michael Smith, subjectivism, value

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