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An Introduction to Auction Theory$
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Flavio M. Menezes and Paulo K. Monteiro

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780199275984

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2005

DOI: 10.1093/019927598X.001.0001

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Mechanism Design

Mechanism Design

Chapter:
(p.75) 6 Mechanism Design
Source:
An Introduction to Auction Theory
Author(s):

Flavio M. Menezes (Contributor Webpage)

Paulo K. Monteiro

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/019927598X.003.0006

This chapter discusses how auction theory under independent types can be presented as a mechanism design problem. It is shown that any two mechanisms that allocate the object in the same way and yield the same expected surplus to the individual with the lowest type will generate the same expected revenue for the seller. A general version of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem is presented and the optimal auction is characterized.

Keywords:   auctions, mechanism design, optimal auction, Revenue Equivalence Theorem

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