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An Introduction to Auction Theory$
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Flavio M. Menezes and Paulo K. Monteiro

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780199275984

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2005

DOI: 10.1093/019927598X.001.0001

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Common Value

Common Value

Chapter:
(p.39) 4 Common Value
Source:
An Introduction to Auction Theory
Author(s):

Flavio M. Menezes (Contributor Webpage)

Paulo K. Monteiro

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/019927598X.003.0004

This chapter discusses common value auction models where the value of the object being sold is the same for all players, but is not known at the time of the auction. Two examples are presented to illustrate the effects of the common value assumption in bidding behaviour and on the seller’s expected revenue. The first assumes that individual signals about the true value of the object are independently determined. In second example, signals are correlated.

Keywords:   common value auction, bidding behaviour, value, individual signals, seller, revenues

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