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How Things Might Have BeenIndividuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties$
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Penelope Mackie

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780199272204

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199272204.001.0001

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Extrinsically Determined Identity and ‘Best‐Candidate’ Theories

Extrinsically Determined Identity and ‘Best‐Candidate’ Theories

Chapter:
(p.70) 4 Extrinsically Determined Identity and ‘Best‐Candidate’ Theories
Source:
How Things Might Have Been
Author(s):

Penelope Mackie (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199272204.003.0004

This chapter discusses the proposal that identities across possible worlds may be determined by ‘extrinsic’ features, and compares this with an analogous ‘best-candidate’ account of identity over time, according to which the identity of an object that exists at one time with an object that exists at another time may depend on the presence or absence of ‘competing candidates’. It argues that even if a best-candidate account of identity over time is acceptable, the ‘extrinsic determination’ account of identity across possible worlds should be rejected in favour of either a ‘bare identities’ or a counterpart-theoretic account.

Keywords:   bare identities, best-candidate, extrinsic determination, identity over time, individual essence

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