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Economic Organizations and Corporate Governance in Japan$
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Curtis J. Milhaupt and Mark D. West

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780199272112

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2004

DOI: 10.1093/0199272115.001.0001

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Introduction

Introduction

Chapter:
(p.1) 1 Introduction
Source:
Economic Organizations and Corporate Governance in Japan
Author(s):

Curtis J. Milhaupt (Contributor Webpage)

Mark D. West (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199272115.003.0001

Outlines the author's institutional and empirical approach, which is to look at the ‘big picture’ rules of the game (institutions, in the form of both formal laws and informal norms and practices) and the fine detail of how those rules are actually impacting incentives, information, and bargaining in the Japanese economy (empirics). In each chapter, the authors explain behaviour in the Japanese economy as a function of the rules of the game. Where applicable, they describe how these rules are changing and why. This approach, novel to studies of Japan, offers compelling answers to heretofore unanswered questions, and provides new perspectives on debates scholars may have thought to be settled.

Keywords:   corporate governance, economy, empirical, Japan, law, new institutional economics

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