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Ethicsand "The Nature of Moral Philosophy"$
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G. E. Moore and William H. Shaw

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199272013

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199272018.001.0001

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The Objectivity of Moral Judgements (concluded)

The Objectivity of Moral Judgements (concluded)

Chapter:
(p.68) 4 The Objectivity of Moral Judgements (concluded)
Source:
Ethics
Author(s):

G. E. Moore

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199272018.003.0004

This chapter continues Moore’s critique of different attitudinal theories of ethics begun in the previous chapter. He discusses theories that view moral judgements as judgements about the will (rather than the feelings) of some being or beings, focusing on the theory that the wrongness of what is wrong consists simply in the fact that God forbids it. Moore then turns to theories that see mental attitudes as determining, not what is right and wrong, but rather what is good and bad.

Keywords:   classes of action, commands, desired for its own sake, God, intrinsically better, mankind, mental attitude, total effects, right

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