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Efficient MonopoliesThe Limits of Competition in the European Property Insurance Market$
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Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780199268818

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2004

DOI: 10.1093/0199268819.001.0001

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(p.56) 2 Spain
Efficient Monopolies

Thomas Von Ungern-Sternberg (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Studies the catastrophe insurance monopoly in Spain, the Consorcio the Compensacion de Seguros. It is shown that the Consorcio operates with exceptionally low administrative costs. It is able to offer a very low cost insurance cover in a domain, where competition would usually lead to market failure due to problems of adverse selection. The existence of the Consorcio is in contradiction with the 3rd EU guidelines on the insurance market. However, Spain managed to get an exemption.

Keywords:   adverse selection, catastrophe insurance, EU‐legislation, Spain, state monopoly

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