Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Seeing, Doing, and KnowingA Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Mohan Matthen

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199268504

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199268509.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 22 November 2019

Pluralistic Realism

Pluralistic Realism

(p.188) 8 Pluralistic Realism
Seeing, Doing, and Knowing

Mohan Matthen (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

A catalogue of mismatches between experienced colour and the physical counterparts of colour is presented. Does it show, as C. L. Hardin has argued, that colour is not real? No. It is proposed that a physically specifiable sense feature is real in the action-relative sense if there is some innate activity that would be disrupted by a failure of classification. This permits a plurality of idiosyncratic sensory classifications, while at the same time makes room for the idea that a sensory state might be wrong.

Keywords:   C. L. Hardin, colour irrealism, David Lewis, Error Theory, opponent processing, physicalism, pluralism, realism, sensation, standards of correctness

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .