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Seeing, Doing, and KnowingA Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception$
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Mohan Matthen

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199268504

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199268509.001.0001

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Visual Objects

Visual Objects

(p.271) 12 Visual Objects
Seeing, Doing, and Knowing

Mohan Matthen (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Vision presents features as located in environmental things. In this chapter, the structure of this feature-locating scheme is investigated. Austen Clark argues, correctly, that visual features are presented to us as properties that belong to certain subjects. Clark, however, thinks that these subjects are regions of space: it is argued here that they are material objects capable of motion, not mere regions of space. Thus, vision presents the world in material object-feature terms. Other modalities employ different structures: audition, for example, attributes features to sounds, not material objects. Such differences among sense modalities with regard to their representations of space and their attributions of features argue that a purely a priori or functional treatment will miss philosophically important characteristics of sensation.

Keywords:   a priori treatments of sense, Austen Clark, binding, form of perception, functionalism, Kant, material objects, motion perception, places, smells, sounds, visual objects

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