Examines the development of robust incentive structures in health care, using two examples from British health care: the holding of budgets for hospital care by organisations of primary‐care physicians (General Practitioner practices and, more recently, Primary Care Trusts), and the payment of hospital specialists or consultants. It concludes that it is possible to design policies that offer robust incentives to medical professionals, that empower patients, but that avoid the problems of unfettered patient choice. Devices such as allowing budget‐holding professionals to keep surpluses on their budget, providing those surpluses are spent in a way that improves patient care, or paying professionals fee‐for‐service at a rate that incorporates some sacrifice compared with alternatives, help align knightly and knavish motivations.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.