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Perfectionism and the Common GoodThemes in the Philosophy of T. H. Green$
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David O. Brink

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199266401

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2004

DOI: 10.1093/0199266409.001.0001

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GREEN AND KANT

GREEN AND KANT

Chapter:
XXVI. GREEN AND KANT
Source:
Perfectionism and the Common Good
Author(s):

David O. Brink (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199266409.003.0026

This chapter examines Green's views toward Kantian doctrines. Green is clearly sympathetic to central Kantian doctrines. First, his criticism of empiricist metaphysics and epistemology is deeply indebted to Kant's views of empirical knowledge in the first Critique. Like Kant, Green also thinks that moral requirements apply to all moral agents in so far as they are agents — that is, in so far as they have capacities for practical reason and independently of contingent inclinations and interests. However, Green is not uncritical of Kant. The Prolegomena promises, but never really delivers, a critical discussion of Kant's ethical theory. A compilation of Green's reservations about Kant's ethical theory from his stray remarks in the Prolegomena and his lectures on Kant's ethics, is presented.

Keywords:   T. H. Green, Kant, Kantian theory, Critique, Prolegomena

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