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Perfectionism and the Common GoodThemes in the Philosophy of T. H. Green$
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David O. Brink

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199266401

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2004

DOI: 10.1093/0199266409.001.0001

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PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM AND THE GOOD

PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM AND THE GOOD

Chapter:
XII. PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM AND THE GOOD
Source:
Perfectionism and the Common Good
Author(s):

David O. Brink (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199266409.003.0012

This chapter focuses on Good's views about the content of good will. Green rejects the hedonism that he finds in the utilitarian tradition and that he associates with a naturalistic approach to ethics. He focuses his criticism of hedonism on Mill's claims in Utilitarianism. One of Green's main complaints is that the plausibility of evaluative hedonism rests on a commitment (perhaps implicit) to psychological hedonism, which rests on the fallacy, which Butler exposed, of inferring that pleasure is the object of desire from the fact that it is expected that pleasure will attend the satisfaction of desire. Green' s Butlerian doubts about psychological hedonism are examined.

Keywords:   T. H. Green, utilitarianism, Mill, Butler, psychological hedonism

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