Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Perfectionism and the Common GoodThemes in the Philosophy of T. H. Green$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

David O. Brink

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199266401

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2004

DOI: 10.1093/0199266409.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 21 October 2019

DESIRE, INTELLECT, AND WILL 9

DESIRE, INTELLECT, AND WILL 9

Chapter:
X. DESIRE, INTELLECT, AND WILL9
Source:
Perfectionism and the Common Good
Author(s):

David O. Brink (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199266409.003.0010

This chapter focuses on Green's view that responsible action involves desire, intellect or belief, and will. Green argues that desire and belief are distinct, though complementary, mental states. They are, in a way, parallel — both involve a kind of ‘striving’ to overcome ‘alienation’ or ‘opposition’ with the world. Having explained the distinction and connections between belief and desire, the question arises whether the will can be reduced to either or is some third state, and what its role is in responsible action. Green believes that willing is distinct from both desire and from belief, and from the simple combination of belief and desire.

Keywords:   T. H. Green, responsible action, belief, mental states

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .