Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Perfectionism and the Common GoodThemes in the Philosophy of T. H. Green$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

David O. Brink

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199266401

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2004

DOI: 10.1093/0199266409.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 08 December 2019

NON‐NATURALISM

NON‐NATURALISM

Chapter:
(p.19) VII. NON‐NATURALISM
Source:
Perfectionism and the Common Good
Author(s):

David O. Brink (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199266409.003.0007

This chapter focuses on Green's non-naturalism, which commits him to his own dualism, inasmuch as he seems to think that a precondition of conscious experience is an active self-conscious mind that is prior to and independent of experience and so outside space and time. It is argued that Green's non-naturalism is problematic. His non-naturalism about the self threatens to reintroduce the very dualism for which he criticizes Kant. A related problem afflicts his view of the Absolute. Whereas the metaphysical and epistemological arguments of the first part of the Prolegomena seem to demand a single transcendent self-consciousness that is outside space and time, much of Green's ethics, political philosophy, and theology seems to treat the corporate spiritual principle as a transhistorical agent that is immanent in the lives of individual agents and progressive social institutions. Green must choose whether the Absolute is transcendent or immanent.

Keywords:   non-naturalism, dualism, Kant, T. H. Green, dualism, the Absolute

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .