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Nondescriptive Meaning and ReferenceAn Ideational Semantics$
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Wayne A. Davis

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199261659

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199261652.001.0001

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Rigidity and Identity

Rigidity and Identity

Chapter:
(p.372) 15 Rigidity and Identity
Source:
Nondescriptive Meaning and Reference
Author(s):

Wayne A. Davis (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199261652.003.0015

This chapter shows that the principle of the necessity of identity, which precludes proper treatment of names in standard possible worlds semantics, fails for logical and epistemic necessity. Model structures allow contingent identities as long as the co-representation relation is non-transitive. It is shown that there is no sound argument from the rigidity of names to the necessity of identity, and that other well known arguments for this principle are either invalid or question begging. The rigidity of names extends to worlds that are mere logical or epistemological possibilities, and is intensional.

Keywords:   necessity of identity, contingent identity, self-identity, logical necessity, epistemic necessity, metaphysical necessity, de jure rigidity, de facto rigidity, intensionality, intensions

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