Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Nondescriptive Meaning and ReferenceAn Ideational Semantics$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Wayne A. Davis

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199261659

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199261652.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 01 April 2020

Defenses of Millianism

Defenses of Millianism

(p.264) 11 Defenses of Millianism
Nondescriptive Meaning and Reference

Wayne A. Davis (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter reviews efforts to explain away the problems with Millian theories, and shows that they are unsuccessful. Soames’s solution to Russell’s problem (existence failures) either adopts a radical modal realism or uses an intentional sense of reference. Some attempts to rebut Frege’s problem (substitutivity failures) ignore opaque interpretations. Kripke took the argument against substitutivity to depend on strong disquotation principles, and presented a puzzle to show that they are problematic. But weaker disquotation principles are available, and substitutivity arguments can be presented without relying on disquotation principles. Gricean attempts to explain away substitutivity failures in terms of metalinguistic or mode implicatures do not help with Russell’s problem or Fine terms, and are unsatisfactory even for Frege’s problem.

Keywords:   existence failures, substitutivity failures, disquotation principles, Kripke’s puzzle, Gricean defenses, metalinguistic implicatures, mode implicatures, triadic relation theory, Soames’s descriptive assertion theory

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .