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Nondescriptive Meaning and ReferenceAn Ideational Semantics$
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Wayne A. Davis

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199261659

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199261652.001.0001

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Millian Theories

Millian Theories

(p.231) 10 Millian Theories
Nondescriptive Meaning and Reference

Wayne A. Davis (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter begins an argument against the ‘Frege-Mill dichotomy’, the assumption that names have either a descriptive sense or no sense at all. Millian theories denying that names have a sense are considered, as well as Millian theories identifying sense with reference. Russell’s and Frege’s problems are the principal objections. Modal version of Millianism that identifies the meaning of a name with an intension or character function cannot avoid these problems without unrealistic existence and identity assumptions.

Keywords:   Frege-Mill dichotomy, Millian theories, sense, reference, Russell’s problem, Frege’s problem, modal Millianism, intension function, character function

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