Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Moral RealismA Defence$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Russ Shafer-Landau

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199259755

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199259755.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 22 September 2019

Supervenience and Causation

Supervenience and Causation

Chapter:
(p.80) Supervenience and Causation 4
Source:
Moral Realism
Author(s):

Russ Shafer-Landau (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199259455.003.0005

Addresses two outstanding worries about ethical non‐naturalism. The first, developed primarily by Simon Blackburn, is that this form of moral realism cannot provide an adequate account of the supervenience of the moral upon the non‐moral. The second, prompted by Gilbert Harman, is that moral facts lack any independent causal power, and so we have excellent reason to regard them as unreal.

Keywords:   Simon Blackburn, causal power, causation, Gilbert Harman, supervenience

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .