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From an Ontological Point of View$
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John Heil

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199259748

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199259747.001.0001

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Dispositional and Categorical Properties

Dispositional and Categorical Properties

Chapter:
(p.85) Chapter 9 Dispositional and Categorical Properties
Source:
From an Ontological Point of View
Author(s):

John Heil (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199259747.003.0009

One popular view of dispositions turns them into ‘higher‐level’ properties with categorical ‘realizers’. The position is motivated in part by the belief that the same disposition can have different bases, and in part by a conviction that powers are contingent features of the world. I argue that the belief and conviction are misguided.

Keywords:   D. M. Armstrong, categorical property, contingent law, disposition, dispositional property, Humeanism, F. Jackson, law, R. Pargetter, power, E. W. Prior, realization

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