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From an Ontological Point of View$
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John Heil

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199259748

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199259747.001.0001

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Intentionality

Intentionality

Chapter:
(p.208) Chapter 18 Intentionality
Source:
From an Ontological Point of View
Author(s):

John Heil (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199259747.003.0018

Dispositions ground the of‐ness and about‐ness of thought. What a thought is about can depend on the world, but a thought's trajectory is internally fixed. ‘Swampman’ is exhibited as a counter‐example to radically externalist accounts of intentionality and Kripke's Wittgenstein's attack on dispositions as bases for rules is defused.

Keywords:   disposition, externalism, individuation, infinity, intentionality, S. Kripke, rule, self, scepticism, Swampman, use, L. Wittgenstein

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