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From an Ontological Point of View$
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John Heil

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199259748

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199259747.001.0001

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Substantial Identity

Substantial Identity

Chapter:
(p.179) Chapter 16 Substantial Identity
Source:
From an Ontological Point of View
Author(s):

John Heil (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199259747.003.0016

Is a statue identical with the lump of bronze that makes it up? This question is discussed in the light of claims that statues and lumps possess distinct ‘modal properties’ and so could not be identical. Progress is possible if we replace the initial question with the question: what is the truth maker for the statement that this is a statue?

Keywords:   constitution, disposition, eliminativism, historical property, identity, indiscernibility, individuation, modal property, object, overlapping, property, realism, relational property, sortal, truth maker

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